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THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT OF 1996: BY
REMOVING CHEMICAL IRRITANTS FROM OUR ENVIRONMENT
WILL IT GENERATE TRADE IRRITANTS TO REPLACE THEM?
EDWARD M. MCDONALD, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
After a number of aborted attempts to enact tougher laws on pesticide
regulation, the U.S. Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act
(FQPA), which was signed by President Clinton in 1996.1 The FQPA is a
response to advances in science that revealed new dangers to humans
posed by many of the pesticides used in the United States. While the
FQPA seeks to update U.S. policy to address new scientific discoveries,
the Act may also create trade irritants with many of our trading partners by
setting tolerances for pesticide residues in food products which are much
more stringent than the tolerances used by other countries.
2
This note will consider some of the trade problems that could result
from the ongoing implementation of the FQPA. Section II considers the
regulatory regime that existed prior to the enactment of the FQPA.
Section III describes the events leading up to the enactment of the FQPA
and how the political climate during the 104th Congress shaped the
legislation. Section IV describes the main features of the FQPA and the
changes it has wrought in the way the United States regulates pesticides.
Section V describes the manner in which the FQPA has been implemented
thus far, including the science policies utilized by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in its risk assessment procedures and some of
the problems encountered in FQPA implementation. Section VI describes
the features and procedures of the primary international organization
dealing with pesticide regulation, the Codex Alimentarius. Section VII
* Mr. McDonald received his B.A. from Indiana University in 1994, his M.P.P. from the
College of William and Mary in 1997, and expects to receive his J.D. from the College of
William and Mary School of Law in 2001.
1 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136i(2), 136r(l), 136w(5)-(7)).
See Alanna Mitchell, Pesticide Residues on Canadian Produce Doubles: Report, GLOBE
& MAIL, May 24, 1999, at A4.
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describes the enactment and main features of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and how its provisions relate to pesticide
regulation. Section VIII details some of the ways that the United States,
Canada, and Mexico are attempting to work through problems posed by
differences in their domestic environmental laws. Section IX details the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its administering
body, the World Trade Organization (WTO), while Section X covers
WTO cases concerning Sanitary/Phytosanitary provisions. Section XI
considers some of the trade problems that the FQPA could create between
the United States and other members of the WTO, with Section XII
concluding the note.
II. THE PRE-FQPA REGULATORY REGIME
The two primary pieces of federal legislation that regulate
pesticides on food products are the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act3 (FIFRA) and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act4 (FFDCA).5 Before a pesticide can be used on a food crop, the
manufacturer or distributor must satisfy the requirements of both FIFRA
and FFDCA.6
A. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
The FIFRA was enacted in 1947 and administered under the
auspices of the Department of Agriculture.7 The law followed the line of
the earlier Federal Insecticide Act of 19108 and focused entirely on
labeling issues. 9 In 1972, the administration of FIFRA was transferred to
the newly created EPA, additional health and environmental standards
were added, and the registration of older pesticides was required.' 0 Under
the terms of FIFRA, the EPA sets the requirements under which pesticides
3 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
4 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994).
5 Scott Douglas Bauer, Note, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Replacing Old
Impracticalities with New Uncertainties in Pesticide Regulation, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1369,
1370 (1997) ("Food products" include raw and processed foods).
6 See Dominic P. Madigan, Note, Setting an Anti-Cancer Policy: Risk, Politics, and the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 191 (1998).
7 James Smart, All the Stars in the Heavens Were in the Right Places: The Passage of the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 273, 277-78 (1998).
s The Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 331 (repealed 1947).




can be used in the field." Persons seeking to register a pesticide under
FIFRA must provide certain information to the EPA, including the
proposed use of the pesticide, data supporting that use, the pesticide's
formula, and a request for classification. 12  Once the application is
complete the EPA will make a determination on whether the pesticide will
cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."' In making
this determination the EPA was authorized to balance the risks and
benefits of the pesticide use.14
B. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
The FFDCA 15 regulates pesticide residues on food products.1
6
Although the FFDCA was enacted in 1938,17 two of its most important
sections, 408 and 409, were added much later.18
The Miller Amendment of 195419 added Section 408 to the
FFDCA.2 °  Under Section 408, raw agricultural commodities are
considered adulterated if they contain pesticide residues.2' Unless the
adulterating pesticide has been granted a "tolerance," use of the
commodity is prohibited.22 A "tolerance" is the level of a specific
pesticide allowed on a specific agricultural commodity.
23
Like FIFRA, the EPA under FFDCA is allowed to take into
consideration the benefits provided by a pesticide along with its risks
when setting residue tolerances. 24 The EPA is to balance the "necessity
[of the pesticide] for the production of an adequate, wholesome, and
economical food supply" with the risks to human health posed by the
pesticide. 25
"See Madigan, supra note 6, at 191.
12 Bauer, supra note 5, at 1372.
"3 21 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C) (1994).
14 See Bauer, supra note 5, at 1373; Madigan, supra note 6, at 191-92.
'" 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994).
16 Bauer, supra note 5, at 1373; Madigan, supra note 6, at 191; Smart, supra note 7, at
277.
17 Smart, supra note 7, at 278.
Is These sections were added in 1954 and 1958 respectively. Id.
'9 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (1994), amended by FQPA, Pub. L. No. 104-170 (1996).
20 Smart, supra note 7, at 278.
21 Madigan, supra note 6, at 192.
22 id.
23 Smart, supra note 7, at 278.
24 See Bauer, supra note 5, at 1374.
25 id.
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In 1958, the Food Additive Amendment26 was enacted and became
Section 409 of the FFDCA.27 Section 409 requires "food additives" to be
found safe before they can be placed on the market.28 Pesticide residues
fall under the definition of food additives when they are either
concentrated in food products during processing or the reduction in the
pesticide level in the food does not meet good manufacturing practice
during food processing29 (the "flow through provision"). 30 Congress
specifically exempted raw foods from the purview of the section.31 Thus
Section 409 requires the setting of tolerances for processed food.32
Under the EPA's interpretation of the Section 402 "flow-through"
provision, 33 a Section 409 tolerance was required for a pesticide if the
pesticide concentrated at all during food processing, even if the resulting
residue still met the tolerance set under Section 408.34 Although Section
409 did not explicitly require a risk-benefit analysis to be used in setting a
tolerance, the EPA considered a pesticide's benefits when setting a
Section 409 tolerance. 3
5
Section 409 contained a clause inserted by Congressman James J.
Delaney (D-NY) that addressed the American public's growing concern
over cancer-causing chemicals. 36 Section 409 was enacted during a period
when scientists were unable to determine if a safe tolerance could be set
for carcinogenic chemicals. 37 The clause states that: "[N]o additive shall
be deemed safe [under Section 409] if it is found to induce cancer when
ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce
26 FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994), amended by FQPA, Pub. L. No. 104-170 (1996).
27 See Smart, supra note 7, at 279.
28 See id.
29See id.
30 FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1994).
31 See Bauer, supra note 5, at 1374.
32 See id.
33 When a tolerance or an exemption has been established for use of a pesticide on a raw
agricultural commodity, then the FFDCA allows for the "flow-through" of such pesticide
residue to processed foods, even when the pesticide may be a carcinogen. This flow-
through is allowed, however, only to the extent that the concentration of the pesticide in
the processed food does not exceed the concentration allowed in the raw food. Les v.
Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1992).
34See Bauer, supra note 5, at 1375.
35 See id. at 1374.
36 See Andrew J. Miller, Note, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Science and
Law at a Crossroads, DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 393, 395 (1997).
"See id. at 396.
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cancer in man or animal.. .,,38 Thus the Delaney Clause banned cancer-
causing food additives by automatically denying them tolerance provisions
for carcinogenic pesticide residues. 39  The standard for cancer-causing
additives was "zero-risk;" no matter how negligible the risk to human or
animal health the chemical posed, its use was banned under the Delaney
Clause. 40 The EPA interpreted the phrase "cancer-causing" in the Delaney
Clause to mean oncogenic, meaning an agent that causes the formation of
tumors, both benign and cancerous, in humans or animals.4'
In an attempt to pursue a unified, logical approach to pesticide
regulation, the EPA implemented a non-statutory "coordination policy" to
tolerance setting.42 If a pesticide was intended for use on a food product,
an applicant for a FIFRA registration would have to qualify for an FFDCA
tolerance (or tolerances depending on whether the FFDCA required the
pesticide to receive both Section 408 and 409 tolerances) as well.43 The
coordination policy also allowed the EPA to deny a Section 408 tolerance
for a pesticide that might be used on food if it failed to receive a Section
409 tolerance because it violated the Delaney Clause.44
C. Pre-FQPA Pesticide Regulation
Thus a pesticide had to navigate through a number of regulations
to be legally used in the United States. A pesticide had to receive a
FIFRA registration to be sold or distributed. A pesticide used (i) for
exclusive use on raw agricultural products that would never be processed
or (ii) on raw products that might be processed but which would not
concentrate during processing only required an FFDCA Section 408
3s Bauer, supra note 5, at 1376 (citing FFDCA § 409, Delaney Clause).
39 See Madigan, supra note 6, at 195.
40 See id.
41 See Smart, supra note 7, at 308. This was in contradistinction to the FDA's (that
regulated all non-pesticide food additives under the FFDCA) interpretation that "cancer
causing" meant carcinogenic or something causing the formation of cancerous tumors
only. Thus the EPA's interpretation was more stringent. The pesticide industry tried to
challenge this interpretation of "cancer causing" as meaning oncogenic and not
carcinogenic. However, they challenged the interpretation after the Les v. Reilly decision
in 1992 relied on the EPA definition. Thus the EPA utilized "res judicata" to retain the
interpretation. See id.
42 See Madigan, supra note 6, at 196-97.
43 See id.
'4 See id.
41 See id. at 191.
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tolerance.46 Pesticides used on raw products that might be processed and
that concentrated during processing required both FFDCA Section 408
and 409 tolerances. 47 The Delaney Clause, in conjunction with the EPA's
coordination clause, denied Section 408 and 409 tolerances and FIFRA
registrations to pesticides in this group that were found to be cancer-
causing.48 Pesticides that were used during or after food processing
required a Section 409 tolerance and were denied tolerances and FIFRA
registrations if they were found to be cancer-causing. 49 Thus the Delaney
Clause created a split in the standards applied to pesticides depending on
whether they were used on raw or processed food.50 Pesticides on raw
foods and non-cancer causing pesticides on processed foods were assessed
tolerances according to a "reasonable certainty of no harm" standard that
included a risk-benefit analysis.51 Cancer-causing pesticides on processed
foods were denied FIFRA registration and FFDCA tolerances under the
"zero-risk" standard of the Delaney Clause. 52
M. THE ENACTMENT OF THE FQPA
A. Growing Dissatisfaction with the Delaney Clause
During the years leading up to the passage of the FQPA, various
groups criticized the Delaney Clause and the manner in which the EPA
implemented it.5 3 The EPA utilized a number of ways of avoiding strict
application of Delaney including the "constituents" policy and the
"sensitivity of method" approach, both of which were first developed and
used by the Food and Drug Administration.54 The constituents policy
allowed the EPA to establish Section 409 tolerances for pesticides if the
pesticide was not cancer-causing as a whole but contained cancer-causing
contaminants.5 5 The sensitivity of method approach allowed the EPA to
establish Section 409 tolerances for cancer-causing residues as long as
they were undetectable at the level prescribed by EPA testing
46 Bauer, supra note 5, at 1376-77.
47 See id. at 1377.
4s See id.
49 Id. at 1376-77.
50 This was termed the "Delaney Paradox." Bauer, supra note 5, at 1377-78.
5
" Id. at 1378.
52 Id.
53 Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1992).




procedures. 56 These approaches came under more and more criticism
from consumer protection and environmental groups as scientific advances
produced increasingly sophisticated testing methods that could detect
pesticide residues at levels lower than were possible when the pesticide
regulations were formulated.5 7
Scientific advances also indicated that cancer was not the only risk
posed by pesticides. Studies revealed that pesticide residues could also
cause birth defects and problems associated with infant and child
development.5 8 Thus the system developed during the 1950s was focused
too narrowly on the risk of cancer. Under FIFRA, pesticides that were
registered prior to 1984 required re-registration.5 9  As knowledge of
problems other than cancer caused by pesticides increased, the regulatory
system appeared to generate some perverse outcomes such as allowing the
registration or re-registration of some pesticides that were much more
injurious to health than many of the oncogenic pesticides banned under the
Delaney Cause.6 ° In addition, the approach utilized by the EPA
conceivably increased the risk of developing cancer due to pesticide
exposure because the Delaney Clause did not ban cancer-causing residues
on raw commodities6 1 that were more carcinogenic than some of the
cancer-causing pesticide residues on processed food that were banned
outright by Delaney.
62
In 1987, a National Research Council (NRC) study recommended
that a single standard be used to set tolerances for pesticide residues on
raw and processed foods.63 The study suggested using a "negligible risk"
standard, a pesticide residue tolerance set so that people would not
experience greater than a one in a million chance of developing cancer
from exposure over the course of a human life span of seventy years.64
In 1988, the EPA adopted a new approach to setting pesticide
residue tolerances, termed the "de minimis" standard, which incorporated
56 id.
57 Frank B. Cross, The Consequences of Consensus: Dangerous Compromises of the
Food Quality Protection Act, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1155, 1159 (1997).
58 Smart, supra note 7, at 275.
59 Id. at 399.
60 Cross, supra note 57, at 1161.
6! The raw commodities in such a case would have to be found to generate benefits that
outweighed their risk of cancer.
62 Cross, supra note 57, at 1161.
63 Allison D. Carpenter, Note, Impact of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 3
ENVTL. L. 479, 482 (1997).
"Miller, supra note 36, at 401.
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the findings of the NRC study.65  The EPA relied on the de minimis
standard to set tolerances for all pesticide residues on all types of food
products from 1989 to 1992.66
B. Judicial Challenges to the De Minimis Standard
In October 1988, at the same time it introduced the new de
minimis standard, the EPA published a list of carcinogenic pesticides 67
and announced that under the new standard it would not revoke the
Section 409 tolerances for four of the pesticides that satisfied the de
minimis standard.68
A number of environmental and consumer groups 69 filed an
administrative petition in 1989 asking that the EPA revoke the tolerances
for the pesticides. 70 After the EPA published a final order denying the
petition, the groups filed a petition for review of the EPA decision in
federal court.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Les v. Reilly72 set
aside the EPA order holding that "the language of the Delaney clause, its
history and purpose all reflect that Congress intended the EPA to prohibit
all additives that are carcinogens, regardless of the degree of risk
involved. ',73 The court said that the Delaney Clause language was "clear
and mandatory" and did not allow any pesticide to be deemed safe (and
thus receive a tolerance) if it was found to induce cancer.74 The court
found that the Delaney Clause did not provide the EPA the flexibility
needed to legally implement the de minimis standard.75
65 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 482.
6 Id.
67 Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1992). Some of the pesticides included
carcinogenic chemicals such as paraquat, parathion, arsenic acid and alachlor 6.
Regulation of Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney Paradox Policy Statement, 53
Fed. Reg. 41,104, App. B. (1988).68 Id. The pesticides were benomyl, mancozeb, trifluralin, and phosmet.
69 The petitioners were the AFL-CIO, the Natural Resources Defense Council and Public
Citizen. Order Responding to Objections to EPA's Response, 56 Fed. Reg. 7750 (1991).
70 Les, 968 F.2d at 988.
7 id.
72 Id. at 985.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 988.
75 Id. at 990.
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The Statute unambiguously provides that pesticides, which
concentrate in processed foods, are to be treated as food
additives, and these are governed by the Delaney food
additive provision contained in section 409 [of the
FFDCA]. If pesticides which concentrate in processed
foods induce cancer in humans or animals, they render the
food adulterated and must be prohibited.76
The court noted that the same issue was litigated in a D.C. Circuit case
involving FDA regulation of color additives.77 In that case the D.C.
Circuit court arrived at the same conclusion as the court in Les: that
Congress intended the Delaney Clause to be strictly applied. 8
In answer to the EPA's argument that the de minimis standard was
a more logical application of the regulatory scheme, the court said,
the EPA in effect asks us to approve what it deems to be a
more enlightened system than that which Congress
established . . . Revising the existing statutory scheme,
however, is neither our function nor the function of the
EPA .... If there is to be a change, it is for the Congress
to direct.79
Thus, the Les decision sounded the death knell of the de minimis approach
and forced the EPA to begin applying the Delaney Clause to all pesticides
that were determined to be cancer-causing. 80 After Les, the EPA began
proposing the revocation of a large number of pesticide tolerances. 81 The
media predicted that the loss of so many pesticides would result in crop
losses and a rise in the price of food, thus Congress came under pressure
from both industry and consumers to reform the old regime.8 2
In 1993, the NRC released another report that caused further
impetus to reform pesticide regulation laws.8 3 The report stated that the
76 Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992).
7 Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).7 8 Les, 968 F.2d at 988.
79 id. at 990.
80 Id.
81 See Smart, supra note 5, at 308; Bauer, supra note 3, at 1382
82 See Cross, supra note 57, at 1160; Smart, supra note 7, at 307.
83 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 483 (citing the report as NATIONAL RESEARCH COuNCiL,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN
(1993)).
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current risk assessment methods for determining acceptable pesticide
residue tolerances might under-protect infants and children from the
adverse effects of pesticide exposure.84 The study indicated that children
and infants might be more sensitive to pesticides85 and that more should be
learned about the adverse effects of pesticide residues on children.8 6 The
report also called for dietary studies to determine which residues children
were ingesting.
87
During the years surrounding the Les decision, Congress made
several attempts to pass legislation revamping the legal framework
through which pesticide residue tolerances were established.88 The 1 0 4 th
Congress finally provided the right circumstances under which legislation
could be passed. In 1995, the EPA settled on a timetable for reassessment
of a large number of cancer causing pesticides, thus giving the pesticide
industry a good indication of when their products would become illegal. 89
The 1 0 4 th Congress thus came under industry pressure to act.90 The
Congress was already under pressure from environmental and consumer
groups because its "Contract With America" was perceived as a major
setback in environmental protection91
This resulted in a compromise between Republicans, Democrats,
the chemical industry lobby and environmental groups, which generated
the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996.92 The law was a victory for the
chemical industry in a number of ways: the FQPA removed pesticides
from the reach of the Delaney clause and the FQPA allowed benefits to be
considered when setting all tolerances. 93 Environmentalists succeeded in
inserting requirements (i) to consider the special susceptibility of children
g Cross, supra note 57, at 1162.
85 Id.
86 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 483.
7 Id.
s A number of bills were introduced in the House and Senate during the Congresses
preceding the 104' Congress but failed due to opposition from either the environmental
or chemical industry lobbies. See Smart, supra note 7, at 309-19.
89 Id. at 319.
9o Id. at 320.
9' Id. at 318.
92 Id. at 332-33.
93 "The term 'pesticide chemical residue' means a residue in or on raw agricultural
commodity or processed food of-(A) a pesticide chemical; or (B) any other added
substance that is present on or in the commodity or food primarily as a result of the
metabolism or other degradation of a pesticide chemical. FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 321(q)(2)
(Supp. V 1999). "The term 'food additive' ... does not include-()a pesticide chemical
residue in or on a raw agricultural commodity or processed food; or (2) a pesticide
chemical." Id. § 321(s).
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and infants;94 (ii) to develop tolerances that addressed pesticides with a
"common mechanism of toxicity" as a single group for determining
maximum acceptable exposure le els; 95 (iii) to screen pesticides for
potential estrogenic and endocrinic effects;96 (iv) to provide consumers
with information about pesticides and their effects; 97 and, (v) to set
tolerances with data from all sources of exposure. 98 Thus, the FQPA
reflected a success for industry on traditional points of contention, while
providing a victory to environmentalists on issues raised by more recent
advances in science. 99
IV. THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT OF 1996
The FQPA revises FFDCA in a number of ways. The most famous
revision is the change in Section 405 of the FFDCA 00 The FQPA
explicitly exempts pesticides from the Delaney Clause's definition of
"food additives," thus effectively removing the dichotomy in approaches
to pesticides on raw and processed foods.' 0' All pesticide residues on
food products are thus regulated under Section 408 of the FFDCA.' °2 This
new single regulatory approach to pesticide residue regulation removes the
"zero-risk" standard of the Delaney Clause, but on the whole, actually
represents a tightening of standards for setting pesticide residue
tolerances. 10 3 This is because tolerances must be set to address a host of
new risk considerations while the incorporation of pesticide benefits into
the tolerance levels are limited to certain circumstances.'14
The FQPA modifies FFDCA Section 408 by requiring the EPA to
ensure that a pesticide is "safe" before issuing or reissuing it a
tolerance. 10 5 "Safe" is defined as a "reasonable certainty that no harm will
94 Id. § 346a(b)(2)(C).
"Id. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(v).
96 Id § 346a(b)(2)(D)(viii).97 FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(o) (Supp. V 1999).
98 Id § 346a(b)(2)(D)(vi).
99 Smart, supra note 7, at 345.
'0o FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(vi) (Supp. V 1999).
1o1 James Handley, The Food Quality Protection Act + EPA's Pesticide Adverse Effects
Reporting Rule = New Data and Better Pesticide Risk Decisions, 28 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,241, 10,242 (1998).
102 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 485.
103 Kenneth Weinstein et al., The Food Quality Protection Act: A New Way of Looking at
Pesticides, 28 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,555, 10,556 (1998).
104 id.
1o5 Handley, supra, note 101, at 10,242.
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result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide residue, including all
anticipated... exposures for which there is reliable information."' 0 6 This
"reasonable certainty of no harm" standard essentially equates to the
standard the EPA had attempted to use under the "de minimis"
approach,107 namely that a pesticide residue tolerance pose no more than a
one in a million chance of harm to a person during the average human
lifespan.1
08
The FQPA allows the EPA to renew or continue tolerances for
pesticide residues not satisfying the "reasonable certainty of no harm"
standard under certain circumstances. 0 9 To qualify for this provision, the
EPA must be able to quantify both the threshold and non-threshold risks
posed by the pesticide and determine that a proposed tolerance adequately
addresses the threshold risks." 1 After making these determinations, the
EPA can issue a tolerance for the pesticide if not issuing the tolerance
would result in greater harm than issuing it or if not issuing the tolerance
would result in a significant disruption of an adequate, wholesome and
economical food supply."'
The FQPA also requires the EPA to consider the cumulative
effects of pesticides with a "common mechanism of toxicity."'112  This
means that lesticides such as organophosphates, which kill insects (and
people if used at high enough levels) by disrupting certain neurological
processes, would be grouped together as pesticides with a common
106 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 485 (quoting the FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a (b)(2)(A)(ii)
(Supp. V 1999)).
107 For an explanation of the "reasonable certainty of no harm" standard under the FQPA
see Valerie Watnick, Risk Assessment: Obfuscation of Policy Decisions in Pesticide
Regulation and the EPA's Dismantling of the Food Quality Protection Act's Safeguards
for Children, 31 ARJZ. ST. L.J. 1315, 1337 (1999). For an explanation of the EPA's "de
minimus" approach see Smart, supra note 7, at 293.
108 See Erin E. Moran, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Does the Delaney
Clause Effectively Protect Against Cancer or Is It Outdated Legislation?, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 1127, 1140 (1997); see also Cross, supra note 57, at 1164 (stating
that the House Report on the FQPA set "reasonable certainty that no harm will result
standard" by adding a hundred-fold safety factor to the level at which a pesticide
generated no observable effect (especially when extrapolating from animal studies)).
FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(c)(3)(A), (B) (Supp. V 1999).
110 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 485. Threshold risks are ones that can be eliminated by
setting a tolerance at a low enough level. Non-threshold risks are ones for which a safe
level cannot be determined (usually non-threshold risks are associated with carcinogens).
Id. at 497 n.61-62.
't Moran, supra note 108, at 1140.
,12 Handley, supra note 101, at 10,243.
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mechanism of toxicity. 113 When setting a tolerance for a pesticide, the
EPA would determine the aggregate tolerance allowable for all pesticides
with the same method of toxicity." 4  Once the aggregate tolerance is
determined, the EPA determines if the individual tolerances for all the
pesticides with the same mechanism of toxicity exceed the aggregate
tolerance. 1 5 If they do, then tolerances must be reset or some tolerances
must be cancelled."16  If an aggregate tolerance has been met, new
pesticides seeking to register and receive a tolerance cannot do so unless
the EPA determines that for some reason (such as in the case of a new
pesticide that was deemed to constitute a lower risk than older pesticides)
the newer pesticide should displace a registered pesticide." 7
As noted above, the EPA must consider all forms of exposure for
which there is sufficient data.118 The EPA has determined that in addition
to the traditional dietary data used to establish exposure levels, it will also
use data on Pesticide levels in drinking water and in residential
environments.'
In response to the discoveries regarding infant and child sensitivity
to the toxic effects of pesticides, the FQPA explicitly addresses the need to
provide higher safety margins to protect this population sub-group.120 The
FQPA requires regulators to set pesticide residue tolerances with regard to
the specific dietary habits of infants and children as well as any special
sensitivities exhibited by the sub-group to the cumulative effects of
pesticides with a common mechanism of toxicity.' 2' When the data on
effects specific to infants and children is incomplete, the EPA can apply
an additional safety factor of up to ten to the tolerance. 22
The FQPA sets a rigorous timetable for the reassessment of all 23
of the tolerances in existence under the regulatory system. 124 One-third of
113 Id.
114 Cross, supra note 57, at 1169. This is termed the "Risk Cup" approach.
115Id.
116 Id. at 1169-70. Once the risk cup is full, regulators must assess new applications for
tolerances to determine if they pose less of a risk than pesticides within the group that
already have a tolerance. If they do, the more dangerous tolerances can be cancelled, or
the tolerances can be lowered to allow in another tolerance. Id. at 1170.
"id. at 1169-70.
'FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1999).
"9 Weinstein et al., supra note 103, at 10,558 n.37.
'20 FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1999).121 See Cross, supra note 57, at 1167; Handley, supra note 101, at 10,243.
122 FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(C) (Supp. V 1999).
123 There are over 9,000 tolerances in existence. Weinstein et al., supra note 103, at
10,561.
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the tolerances had to be reassessed using the new criteria set under the
FQPA by 1999; two-thirds by 2002 and all must be reassessed by 2006.125
The first group of pesticides to be reassessed includes organophosphate
pesticides.' 26  After the initial reassessment process, the EPA must
conduct new reassessments of pesticide residue tolerances on a fifteen-
year cycle. '
27
The FQPA requires that the EPA have a screening program
implemented by August 8, 1999 to determine which pesticides are
endocrine disruptors.' 2 8 The FQPA unifies tolerances within the United
States to a certain extent because it explicitly states that tolerances set
under federal law preempt stricter tolerances set according to state
procedures. 129 Consumers are provided with more information regarding
the risks and benefits associated with specific pesticides, as well as ways
that consumers can avoid possible exposure to certain pesticides. 130 The
EPA must provide grocers with information brochures, which they can
display in their establishments.' 31 The Act increases the amount that can
be appropriated for monitoring of pesticide levels in food and provides
criminal and civil remedies for violations of the Act.'
32
Finally, the Act recognizes that the United States is part of an
increasingly interconnected global economy and thus encourages tolerance
harmonization with the "maximum residue levels" (MRLs) set by the
international body responsible for setting pesticide residue tolerances, the
Codex Alimentarius Commission.
33
124 Len Richardson, Beyond Zero Risk, CAL. FARMER, Sept. 1996, available at http:/f
www.ecologic-ipm.com/rich2.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
12 5 id.
126 Handley, supra note 101, at 10,243.
121 Id. at 10,243 n.28.
128 Moran, supra note 108, at 1145; Carpenter, supra note 63, at 488. Xenoestrogens,
which are present in some pesticides, have been found to cause breast cancer in women.
Moran, supra note 108, at 1145.
129 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 489. A state can set a stricter tolerance only if the state
convinces the EPA to grant an exemption based on the special population needs or
increased needs due to local conditions. Id. at 497 n. 100.
130 See id. at 488; Stephen L. Johnson, Implementation of the Food Quality Protection
Act, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 528 (1997).
131 See Carpenter, supra note 63, at 488; Johnson, supra note 130, at 528. Starting in
1998, the EPA was required to distribute the brochures to large retail grocers each year.
See Carpenter, supra note 63, at 488.
13 2 See id. at 490.




The enactment of the FQPA evinces an increase in congressional
confidence in the ability of science to adequately identify and assess risk
and of regulators to utilize risk assessments in risk management. 34 This
confidence grew from scientific advances in analytical chemistry that
allow detection of trace residues in food that are many orders of
magnitude greater than was possible in the 1950s.135  Increasingly
sophisticated and sensitive methods of pesticide residue detection were
coupled with advances in other areas such as a better understanding of the
conditions leading to cancerous growths and dangers other than cancer
that exposure to pesticide residues posed.136 The Delaney Clause was a
bright-line rule developed by a Congress that believed that many of the
risks presented by pesticides were real but unquantifiable. 137 The unified
standard presented by the FQPA reflects Congressional confidence in
scientists' ability to quantify more of the risks posed by pesticides and
thus set specific tolerances for them.1 38 However, the risk assessment and
management policies that the EPA has developed in response to the
increased reliance on science generated by the FQPA indicate that
increasingly sophisticated approaches to scientific analysis do not always
result in procedures that produce pesticide residue tolerances that better
correspond to the health risks posed by a pesticide.' 39
The risk assessment procedures that the EPA continues to use are
often based on extremely conservative default assumptions. 14  The 1987
NRC study141 utilized the EPA's tolerances and risk assessment
methodology.142 The study estimated a lifetime risk of cancer of 1 in 6000
when adding the total risk of the twenty-eight carcinogenic pesticides used
in the study.' 43 When independent studies recalculated the risk based on
134 Madigan, supra note 6, at 230.
135 Id.
136 id.
131 Id. at 236.
138 id.
139 See Cross, supra note 57, at 1167; see generally Bauer, supra note 5, at 1480-81;
Miller, supra note 36, at 417.140 Implementation Working Group, EPA's Implementation of FQPA to Date, at http://
www.fqpa.com/index (last visited Mar. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Implementation Working
Group, Implementation of FQPA].
141 Carpenter, supra note 65, at 497.
142 Cross, supra note 57, at 1173.
143 See id.
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actual dietary exposures, the risks were determined to be between 4600
and 100,000 times lower than the NRC estimates.1
44
EPA methodology also assumes that pesticides are used to the
maximum amount allowable under their tolerances.145 In circumstances
where pesticide pollution is not regulated, pesticide users have a built-in
economic incentive to use as little pesticide as possible in order to
maximize profits. 146 When the default assumption of maximum usage was
compared to the average amount of combined pesticides actually used on
crops, studies in California indicated that EPA risk assessment
methodology overestimated exposure rate by up to twenty-five times the
actual exposure rate. 1
47
In order to meet the difficult reassessment schedule provided under
the FQPA, the EPA has decided to rely on assumptions regarding pesticide
toxicity; factors related to pesticide exposure including nature, level,
duration and effect; and exposure to multiple pesticides with common
mechanisms of toxicity. 148  The EPA has also applied the ten-fold
uncertainty factor in assessing risk to children in almost every risk
assessment case, a4policy that contradicts its initial policy on use of the
uncertainty factor.
The first major groups of pesticides that the EPA is reassessing
under the FQPA are the organophosphates (OPs), carbanates and
carcinogenic pesticides. 50 As per its approach to risk assessment in
general, the EPA's assessment of tolerances for OPs and carbamates are
very conservative. 1
5 1
Organophosphates and carbamates both share cholinesterase (ChE)
inhibition as their common mechanism of toxicity. 1 2 Muscles and nerve
'4 See id. at 1174.
145 See id. at 1173.146See id.
147 See id. at n.74
148 Implementation Working Group, Implementation of FQPA, supra note 140.
149 see id.
150 see id.
1 'See Implementation Working Group, Choice and Use of Endpoints in Risk Assessments
of Cholinesterase Inhibitors, at http://www.fqpa.com /index (last visited Mar. 27, 2001)
[hereinafter Implementation Working Group, Use of Endpoints]. For example, the EPA
relies on default assumptions that each user of pesticide will use it to the maximum
amount. The EPA factors in several loX factors to account for differences across
population, differences between animals and people (in animal studies) and for special
sub-populations like children. In the case of cholinesterase inhibitors, the EPA looks at
1lasma cholinesterase inhibition which is not considered a "harm." Id.2 Extension Toxicology Network, Cholinesterase Inhibition, at http://ace.orst.edu/
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fibers are both stimulated by the activation of synapses, which are
electrical on/off switches in the -body.153 The enzyme acetylcholine
activates the synapse, while acetylcholinesterase (AChE) deactivates the
synapse. 154  ChE inhibitors block the ability of AChE to break down
acetylcholine, thus causing continual synaptic stimulation leading to a
neurological overload. This overload can be fatal if the ChE inhibitor is
present in sufficient quantities.15
5
In setting "reference doses" (RID), the EPA considers "no
observable adverse effect levels" (NOAEL).156 RIDs are used to establish
tolerances for pesticide residues.' 57 However in setting reference doses,
and thus pesticide residue tolerances for organophosphates, the EPA has
based its determinations on evidence of a drop in levels of plasma
cholinesterase (primarily BuChE).158
Blood contains two types of ChE, AChE and butyrylcholinesterase
(BuChE).' 59 Neither Red Blood Cell AChE (RBC AChE) nor BuChE is
involved in neurotransmission, thus basing tests on organophosphate
inhibition of RBC AChE or BuChE does not directly indicate that an
animal or human is experiencing hann.16 Only by combining evidence of
RBC AChE inhibition with the observable effects of the physical
manifestations of toxicity can scientists generate an acceptable indication
of an adverse effect caused by OP poisoning. 16 1 Researchers can also
measure drops in AChE in brain tissue to determine if harm has occurred
due to OP poisoning' 62  Drops in blood ChE are only indications of
exposure to ChE inhibitors, not observable adverse effects.1
63




156 See Implementation Working Group, Use of Endpoints, supra note 151. A reference
dose is a level of exposure to a chemical that someone can endure over a lifetime without
suffering harm. It is usually calculated by dividing a "no observable adverse effect level"
(NOAEL) developed in animal experiments by a factor of 100 for use in determining




'60 See id. The World Health Organization/Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues has
stated that inhibition of plasma and brain BuChE levels are toxicologically non-
significant although they can be used as indicators of exposure to ChE inhibitors. See
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The current EPA approach to setting tolerances for ChE inhibiting
pesticides, such as OPs and carbamates, involves measuring drops in
plasma ClE, with or without physical manifestations of toxic reaction, and
then applying an uncertainty factor of 100 to generate a tolerance. 164 This
approach was rejected as overly conservative by the EPA's Science
Advisory Board in 1990, when the EPA first suggested it. 165
While the United States is using plasma ChE as a toxicological
endpoint, the EU and Canada are using Red Blood Cell ChE and the brain
as toxicological endpoints.' 66 The Codex Alimentarius Commission, the
international pesticide residue setting body, has twice rejected EPA
lobbying efforts for the Codex to adopt plasma ChE as the endpoint in
Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs, which is another term for pesticide
tolerances) set by the Codex.167
The use of different toxicological endpoints will generate different
tolerances for the pesticides involved.' 68 The United States imports more
than 5.4 billion dollars worth of food products from EU nations' 69 and
more than 6.1 billion dollars worth of food products from its NAFTA
partners. 170  In markets involving billions of dollars, even slight
differences in tolerance levels could result in the loss of considerable
amounts of money to the party with the less stringent pesticide residue
tolerance. 171
In addition to the differences surrounding endpoints for ChE
inhibitor risk studies, the United States and the EU are using different
points along the statistical distribution curve of acute dietary exposures to
16See id.
165 See id. In the Standard Operating Procedure for measuring ChE, the EPA indicates it
measures plasma AChE and plasma BuChE drops in laboratory rats and dogs to assess
effects of ChE inhibitors. Environmental Protection Agency, Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP): Clinical Methodology for Measuring Cholinesterase Activity in
Laboratory Rats/Dogs, at http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstrlEPA-PEST/1996/April/Day26/
pr666DIR/Support/SOP.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
See FQPA Implementation Could Have Serious Trade Impacts, Analysts Warn, FOOD
CHEMICAL NEWS, May 10, 1999.
167 See id.
168 Implementation Working Group, Use of Endpoints, supra note 151.
169 This approximation was generated by adding together the value of 1998 exports from
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Belgium,
and Ireland to the U.S. International Trade Administration, Top 25 Import Sources for:
Processed Food and Beverages, at http://www.ita.doc.gov/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2001).170 Generated by adding together the value of 1998 exports from Canada and Mexico to




set tolerances.172 While the EPA indicated in a science policy paper
issued on April 7, 1999 that it will set tolerances that will theoretically
prevent 99.9% of the possible harm posed by certain pesticides, the
Europeans plan to regulate at the 95th or 97.5 th percentile. 173  The
difference in regulation points would affect the tolerance levels set and
result in possible trade irritants between the United States and the EU.
174
The use of a 9 9th percentile tolerance as opposed to a 97.5th or 95th
percentile tolerance has been characterized by some analysts as a "purely
social choice.' ' 175 While the EPA has not made a final decision on where
to regulate on the distributional curve, it has adopted the 9 9 .9 th percentile
as an interim policy. 176  Given the tight schedule for pesticide
reassessment, many of the pesticides due for the initial rounds of
reassessment could be affected by the interim policy. 1
77
Tougher risk assessments resulted in the voluntary cancellation of
seven of the fourteen pesticides reassessed during fiscal year (FY) 1999.178
The science policies the EPA is using to implement the provisions of the
Food Quality Protection Act could conceivably create or reinforce
disparities in tolerances between the United States and its trading partners
resulting in trade irritants and possible international litigation through an
international trade forum such as the Dispute Settlement Procedure of
NAFTA or the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement
Understanding.
179
172 See FQPA Implementation Could Have Serious Trade Impacts, supra note 166.
173 See id.
174 see id.
175 See id. Risk assessment is a scientific endeavor, however, risk management is a
policy endeavor. But in many cases there is a very fine line between the two calculations.
See, e.g., David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade
Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817, 833 (1994).
171 Pesticides: EPA Releasing Nearly All Papers on Science Policies Under Food Safety
Law, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA), Oct. 22, 1999, at d8.177 See id. (explaining that in FY 1999, the EPA completed only fourteen reassessment
evaluation decisions, less than half of the thirty-four scheduled for FY 1999. Id.
178 See id. With the more stringent chemical residue standards established by the FQPA,
many registrants voluntarily withdrew their products during the registration process,
knowing that their product would fail to meet the new standards. Pesticides: EPA FY
1999 Reregistration Results in Seven Cancellations, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA),
Oct. 27, 1999, at d7.
179 See generally Alanna Mitchell, Pesticide Residues on Canadian Produce Doubles:
Report, GLOBE & MAIL, May 24, 1999, at A4 (discussing the enormous growth rate in
pesticide residue on fresh fruits and vegetables); Pesticides: Insecticide Review Could
Affect Trade with Canada, Mexico, Work Group Says, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA),
Aug. 28, 1998, at d7 (suggesting possible trade irritants caused by organophosphate
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VI. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS
Both the NAFTA and the WTO encourage member comliance
with relevant international standard setting organizations.'" The
international organization responsible for setting pesticide tolerances, or
MRLs is the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex). 181 The Codex is
run under the auspices of both the World Heath Organization (WHO) and
the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).' 2  The Joint
FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR) was established in
1963 and is independent of the Codex structure. I1 3  It is comprised of
eminent scientists who are recognized as experts in the field of pesticides,
environmental chemicals and their residues.' 8 4 The JMPR works closely
with the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) providing input
to CCPR preliminary MRLs before they are forwarded to the Codex
Commission for approval or rejection.' 8 5 The JMPR also recommends
reassessment); Pesticides: Pest Control Disparities, Trade Irritants Seen as Factors in
Harmonizing Efforts, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA), May 10, 1999, at d5 (offering
that disparities in pest control tools need to be addressed); FQPA Implementation Could
Have Serious Trade Impacts, Analysts Warn, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, May 10, 1999.
180 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1 LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URAGUAY ROUND, art. 3, available at
http://www.wto.org/ english/docs e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2001);
Agreement to Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, I LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URAGUAY ROUND, art. 2.6, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legale/17-
tbt.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2001); North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, art. 764(3), 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA U-C-M].
iV. In pursuance of harmonization, with regard to food safety the
[Sanitary/Phytosanitary Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] has identified and chosen the standards, guidelines and
recommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission for
... pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling,
and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice. This means that Codex
standards are considered scientifically justified and are accepted as the
benchmarks against which national measures and regulations are
evaluated.
Codex and the International Food Trade, at http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9114e/W9114







methods of sampling and analysis. 186 Codex MRLs are eventually ratified
by the WHO and the FAO and are then forwarded to individual
governments for acceptance or rejection.18 7
The Codex appears to be closer to the EU's approach to setting
tolerances at a risk avoidance level between the 9 5th and 97.5th percentile
instead of the 9 9 .9th percentile approach being utilized by the EPA.
188
However, in an April 1,999 meeting at the Hague, the CCPR stated that the
Codex would leave individual governments to work out MRLs based on
pesticide interaction and acute dietary risk assessments.' 89 Although the
CCPR has reiterated that countries should be willing to harmonize their
standards with those set by the Codex, the CCPR would not oppose the
implementation of the FQPA.190
VII. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
One of the two major international trade agreements that the
United States is a party to is NAFTA. 191 In December 1987, Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan set the
groundwork for NAFTA when they signed the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement. 192  Shortly after the agreement between Canada and the
United States was finalized, Mexico expressed an interest in negotiating a
similar agreement with the United States. 193 Canada eventually entered
the bilateral negotiations and all three entered into NAFTA in November
1993. 194 Public concerns over Mexico's lower environmental standards
prompted U.S. officials to insert a number of mechanisms into the
agreement to ensure that NAFTA would not undercut U.S. domestic
186 See id.
187 Pesticides: Risk Methods, Extraneous Limits Focus of Codex Residue Committee,
CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA), Apr. 27, 1999, at d3.188 FQPA Implementation Could Have Serious Trade Impacts, Analysts Warn, FOOD
CHEM. NEWS, May 10, 1999. The JMPR has proposed using the 97 .5th percentile. See id.189 Pesticides: Risk Methods, Extraneous Limits Focus of Codex Residue Committee,
SPra note 187.Pesticides: Codex Commission Not Expected to Oppose U.S. Implementation of FQPA,
CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA), Oct. 23, 1998, at d7.
191 NAFTA U-C-M, supra note 180, at art. 724.
192 See Ignacia S. Moreno et al., Free Trade and the Environment: The NAFTA, the
NAAEC, and Implications for the Future, 12 TuL. ENvTL. L.J. 405, 410 (1999) (citing
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environmental standards. Like GATT, NAFTA contains a
Sanitary/Phytosanitary 95 provision that allows a party to NAFTA to
"protect animal or plant life or health in its territory . . . from the
introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or disease,... the presence
of an additive, contaminant, toxin or disease-causing organism in a food,
beverage or feedstuff," and "to prevent or limit other damage arising in its
territory from the introduction, establishment or spread of a pest.""6 The
NAFTA SPS provision allows a member to adopt SPS measures that are
more stringent than an international standard, guideline or
recommendation if necessary and adopted in accordance with the SPS
agreement. 197 A party adopting an SPS measure must ensure that the SPS
measure is: "(a) based on scientific procedures, taking into account
relevant factors including, where appropriate, different geographic
conditions; (b) not maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis
for it; and (c) based on a risk assessment, as appropriate to the
circumstances."' 98 Members are prohibited from using SPS measures that
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against other NAFTA members. 199
SPS measures can only be applied to the extent necessary to achieve the
appropriate levels of protection desired by the member nation.20 0
The United States, Canada, and Mexico also negotiated an
environmental side agreement to NAFTA entitled the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). 20 1 The objective of
the NAAEC was, inter alia, to work cooperatively to protect the
environment of all three countries by enhancing enforcement and
compliance with environmental laws and regulations, promote
transparency, and avoid creating distortions and barriers to trade based on
differing environmental standards.20 2 In order to accomplish the aims of
the NAAEC, the agreement created the North American Commission for
195 "Sanitary" refers to measures to protect animal and human health. "Phytosanitary"
refers to measures designed to protect plant health. See NAFTA U-C-M, supra note 180,
at art. 724.196 id.
197 Id. at art. 713, para. 3.
"9 Id. at art. 712, para 12. The NAFTA SPS agreement defines "scientific basis" as a
"reason based on data or information derived using scientific methods." Id. at art. 724.
1' North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
200 Id. at art. 754(5). The "appropriate level of protection" is defined as what the
invoking party feels is appropriate. Id. at art. 712, para 5. In addition NAFTA members
are not allowed to use SPS measures as a proxy for trade restrictions. Id. at art. 754(6).
201 Moreno et al., supra note 192, at 422.
202 Id. at 422-23.
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Environmental Cooperation, which consists of cabinet-level officials who
serve as a guiding council for an implementing body entitled the
Secretariat.2 °3 The Secretariat receives public input through a Joint Public
Advisory Committee. 204
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation has instituted a
number of provisions to coordinate NAFTA members' approach to
environmental issues. One of the initiatives seeks to phase out two
pesticides, DDT and Chlordane, over the next decade.
20 5
VIII. How NAFTA Is DEALING WITH PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE FQPA
The passage of the FQPA in 1996 set the stage for trade problems
between the United States and its NAFTA trading partners by creating a
regulatory regime in the United States that would be much stricter than
either the Canadian or Mexican regulations in place.20 6 Trade disputes
arose along the Canada-U.S. border in the fall of 1998 due to the disparity
in pesticides available for use on canola; wheat, and barley crops. 2° v The
concern over trade irritants developing between the two countries was
further highlighted by a report in 1999 by the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency finding that detectable pesticide residue on Canadian fruit had
more than doubled since 1994.208
The United States and Canada quickly moved to address the
problems.20 9 Fortunately structures already exist to address the need to
coordinate pesticide regulations. The NAFTA Technical Working Group
on Pesticides [TWG] was established to work toward harmonization of
pesticide regulations among the three parties to NAFTA.21° The TWG
continues to negotiate harmonization agreements among the parties, such
as draft guidance on pesticide labeling which harmonizes labeling across
203 See id. at 424-25.
204 See id. at 425.
205 See id. at 428.
206 See generally Pesticides: Insecticide Review Could Affect Trade with Canada, Mexico,
Work Group Says, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 28, 1998, at d7 (suggesting possible
trade irritants caused by organophosphate reassessment) [hereinafter Insecticide Review];
Pesticides: Pest Control Disparities, Trade Irritants Seen as Factors in Harmonizing
Efforts, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS, May 10, 1999, at d5 (offering that disparities in pest
control tools need to be addressed) [hereinafter Pest Control Disparities]; FQPA
Implementation Could Have Serious Trade Impacts, supra note 166.7 See Pest Control Disparities, supra note 206.
208 Mitchell, supra note 179.
209 Pest Control Disparities, supra note 206.
210 See id.
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countries and individual companies and guards against over-spraying
which can increase insect resistance to pesticides and result in a need to
apply higher levels of pesticide or utilize a more toxic pesticide to control
pests.21' The TWG has also begun to address the effect the FQPA is
having on the use of organophosphate-based pesticides. 2  The TWG has
issued a report indicating that it intends to "share pesticide regulation
efforts, harmonize scientific and policy considerations for such regulation,
and reduce trade barriers." 213  The report indicates that Canada and
Mexico have begun to "identify critical uses and potential alternatives to
the organophosphate and carbamate pesticides in order to minimize the
potential barriers to trade. ''214 In addition, the TWG emphasizes the need
to build on the NAFTA structures already in place to ensure that the
FQPA causes as little conflict as possible.1 The FQPA can, and already
has, caused some trade problems between the United States and its
NAFTA partners. Fortunately, the three countries have extensive
structures in place working to smooth over trade disputes and harmonize
standards, tolerances and risk assessment approaches so that trade disputes
do not need to be settled through NAFTA's official dispute settlement
procedure, which could conceivably sour trade relations between the
NAFTA members. 216
This situation is not necessarily mirrored in the United States'
relations with its WTO partners, particularly the EU.
IX. THE GATT AND THE WTO
The international legal framework through which the United States
conducts trade with most of the nations of the world is the GATT, which
was incorporated into the WTO at its creation on January 1, 1995.217 The
GATT is a legal framework designed to lower trade barriers among
member nations. 8 It began in 1947 by requiring members to lower tariffs
211 Pesticides: Label Guidance on Insect Resistance Expected from EPA; Developed
Under NAFTA, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA), July 1, 1999, at d5.




217 TRADING INTO THE FUTURE: WTO, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 4 (2d ed.
1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/rese/doload-e/tif.pdf (last visited Mar.
27, 2001).
211 See id. at 9.
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between themselves-and treat all GATT members the same.2 19 The GATT
also covers non-tariff barriers including domestic regulations which create
undue barriers to market entry.22 °
However, Article XX of GATT 221 allows members to impose trade
restrictions in order to protect, among other things, "human, animal or
plant life or health., 222 Article XX barriers must be applied according to
certain requirements including a Sanitary/Phytosanitary (SPS) measure
similar to the one in NAFTA. The GATT SPS provisions can only be
used when they are "(a) 'necessary to protect human, animal or plant life';
(b) 'based on scientific principles' and (c) not be 'maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence."' 224  The measures are presumed
"necessary" if they are based on standards set by an international standard
setting organization such as the Codex. 225  Where information is
insufficient, a member may establish interim standards but must adopt a
permanent standard as quickly as possible.226 The United States interprets
the measure as allowing a member to set an acceptable level of risk
thiough a political or policy process and then supplying a sufficient
scientific rationale for the measure after the policy is in place.227
One of the main contributions of the WTO has been to establish a
forum for settling trade disputes between members. 228  The Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO establishes a "panel" which is a
tribunal set up to hear these members' trade disputes.229 The decision of a
219 See id.
220 Id. at 33.
221 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected
Documents, 4' Supp., 37-38 (1969) [hereinafter GATT 1947].222 John H. Barton, Biotechnology, the Environment, and International Agricultural
Trade, 9 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 95, 100 (1996) (quoting Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Article XX.)
223 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15, 1993
reprinted in Law & Practice of the World Trade Organization Booklet 1, 59 (Joseph F.
Dennin ed., 1995) [hereinafter GATT SPS Agreement]; see also North American Free
Trade Agreement, art. 754, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, available at http://
www.tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/Nafta/07.agro (last visited Mar. 27, 2001).
224 Barton, supra note 222, at 101 (quoting GATT SPS Agreement).
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 10 1-02.
228 See TRADING INTO THE FUTuRE: WTO, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra
note 217, at 38.
229 See id. at 39.
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WTO panel can be appealed.23° If the DSB adopts the decision of a panel,
or the Appellate Body if a panel's decision is, appealed, the offending
member must rectify its violation of the GATT. If the offending
member nation chooses, it can continue to keep the violative trade
restriction in place and compensate the complainant.232 The complainant
can also request the WTO's General Council to allow the complainant to
apply retaliatory tariffs to the offending nation in particular areas of
interest to the complainant. 33  Under the WTO, a panel can request
scientific or technical advice before issuing a decision.234 This ability,
when viewed in conjunction with the GATT SPS requirement that an SPS
measure be supported by "sufficient scientific evidence," 235 has led at least
one court to the conclusion that the framework exists in the WTO/GATT
to enable an international tribunal to review domestic science policy
decisions,236 such as risk assessment methodology and tolerance setting, if
the tribunal determines that domestic regulations create an unjustified
barrier to trade.237
X. WTO CASES ADDRESSING SANITARY/PHYTOSANITARY PROVISIONS
Several cases surrounding the GATT SPS agreement have been
adjudicated.238 The most famous of the SPS cases is a beef hormone
dispute between the EU and the United States.239 In 1989, the EU invoked
230 See id. at 40.
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See id.234 See Barton, supra note 222, at 103.
235 The term "sufficient" is absent from the NAFTA SPS agreement. See id. at 102.
236 See David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade
Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817, 845 (1994) (asserting that in a 1989 GATT
Panel Report, the Panel substituted its own judgment in place of that of scientific experts'
numerical determinations under the U.S.-Canada bilateral free trade agreement).
,237 id.
238 The WTO DSB has decided three cases under the GATT SPS agreement: (i) the
European Union (EU) beef hormone dispute, (ii) the Australian salmon dispute, and (iii)
the Japanese agricultural products dispute. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johnson,
The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization and International Organizations:
The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection
Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
27, 29 (1998).
239 The complaints came from both the United States and Canada and generated two
WTO Panel Reports, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/R/USA and EC Measures Concerning Meat
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GATT's SPS provisions to ban the importation of live animals and meat
from animals treated with any of six hormones. 240 The United States and
Canada challenged the ban, claiming that the ban constituted an SPS
measure that constrained trade241 and was unsupported by scientific
evidence.242 The United States uses hormones in its beef products and the
EU ban cost the United States hundreds of millions of dollars in lost
sales.
243
The parties took the dispute before a WTO panel in the fall of
1996.2 4 The United States contended that the ban was illegal under the
SPS because: (a) the risk assessment performed prior to the ban did not
support a ban; (b) the ban "lacked a scientific foundation;" (c) the ban did
"not apply only to the extent necessary to protect human life or health;"
and (d) the measure was "more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
the appropriate level of sanitary protection." 245
The EU claimed that the SPS agreement allowed the invoking
country to determine what level of protection was appropriate for its
citizens. 246 The EU contended that it set a more stringent standard on
hormones than the United States did because it weighed consumer health
over economic interests in contrast to the purported United States
assessment.247 The WTO panel held that the EU had violated the SPS
agreement. 248 The EU appealed and the appellate body affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
249
In regard to the issue of the standard of review that should be
applied to the validity of scientific determinations made by domestic
administrative bodies, the Appellate Body refused to establish a standard
of review (including the deferential standard proffered by the United
and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN, available at
http:// www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/distab-e.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2001)
hereinafter WTO Panel Reports].
40 See Lisa K. Seilheimer, Note, The SPS Agreement Applied: The WTO Hormone Beef
Case, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 537, 537 (1998) (listing the hormones as oestradiol-17(beta),
progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone, zeranol, and melengestrol acetate (MGA)).
24 See id. at 544.242 See id. at 537.
243 See id. at 543.
244 See WTO Panel Reports, supra note 239.
245 Seilheimer, supra note 240, at 544.
246 See id. at 545.
24A7 See id.
248 See David A. Wirth, International Decisions, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 755, 755 (1998).
249 See id.
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States).25 ° Instead, the Appellate Body declined to reverse the panel
determinations unless they constituted a "deliberate disregard of evidence
or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. '251 The Panel had refused to
apply a "deferential reasonableness standard" urged by the EU252 and had
ruled that a general "precautionary principle" does not guide the use of
SPS measures allowing member nations to err on the side of caution when
the precautionary principle undercuts Article 5 of the SPS Agreement,
which requires that protective measures be based on a risk assessment.
253
The Panel determination amounted to a finding that the EU standard was
over-protective and had utilized too many assumptions, which biased the
risk assessment up to a scientifically unsupportable level.254 The evidence
of the "risk assessment" proffered by the EU indicated that the ban on
hormone treated beef was instituted after a number of conferences on the
subject of food quality control had discussed the possibility that abusive
use of hormones could cause health risks and would be difficult to
detect.255 But the conferences had not resulted in any empirical studies
that backed up the alleged risks. 256 Both the Panel and Appellate Body
found that "[a]t best, this study may represent the beginning of an
assessment of such risks. 257 Both decisions also held that the EU's policy
250 See id. at 758. For the U.S. approach see Barton, supra note 222, at 102 (quoting EC
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones): Report of the Appellate
Body, WTODOC WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, paras. 100-19 and 253(b), at
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratope/ distab e.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2001)
Ihereinafter Appellate Report]).
51 Wirth, supra note 248, at 758.
252 Appellate Report, supra note 250, at para. 113.
113 See id. at para. 125. Article 5 of the SPS Agreement of the WTO requires that
members: (1) base SPS measures on a risk assessment; (2) take into account available
scientific evidence, as well as relevant sampling and testing methods; (3) seek to
minimize negative trade effects; and (4) avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the
levels of protection the member nation applies in different circumstances. See
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 31 LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS URUGUAY ROUND 5.1-5.5, at http://www.wto.org/english/
docse/legal e/fimal-e.htm. (last visited Mar. 27, 2001) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
254 Seilheimer, supra note 240, at 557-59.
255 See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint By
the United States, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispue/distabe.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.
Complaint]; see also Appellate Report, supra note 250, at para. 207.




went against numerous studies that indicated that hormone treated beef
was safe if administered in accordance with good practice.258
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that the
defending party initially bear the burden of proof, stating that a challenger
to an SPS measure must first present a prima facie case for each alleged
violation of the SPS agreement before the burden could be shifted onto the
member invoking the SPS measure.259 The appellate opinion reversed the
Panel's holding that the EU's ban was required to "tightly conform to"
standards set by an international standard-setting organization such as the
Codex. 260 The Appellate Body upheld the panel ruling that found the EU
ban to lack a scientific reason for applying the ban.26' Additionally, the
Appellate Body held that SPS agreement does not "require a risk
assessment to establish a minimum quantifiable magnitude of risk, nor
do[es the Agreement] exclude a priori, from the scope of a risk
assessment, factors which are not susceptible of quantitative analysis by
the empirical or experimental laboratory methods commonly associated
with the physical sciences." 262 The United States has recently received
permission to apply retaliatory trade measures to the EU.263 Thus the
Appellate Body decision in the beef hormone case seemingly gave a great
deal of discretion to the Panel in reviewing whether SPS measures were
maintained with sufficient scientific evidence.
In a recent decision on Japan's use of SPS measures to block U.S.
food products potentially infested with the codling moth,2 64 the Appellate
Body explicated its holdings in the SPS cases to date. The Appellate Body
explained that Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, which requires that
members "ensure that any sanitary and phytosanitary measure ... is not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in
paragraph 7 of Article 5, '265 was to be read in close conjunction with the
risk assessment requirement of Article 5.1266 as well as with the
258 See US. Complaint, supra note 255; Appellate Report, supra note 250, at para. 250.
25 9 See Appellate Report, supra note 250, at para. 109.
260 See Wirth, supra note 248, at 756 (quoting U.S. Complaint, supra note 255, at §
26 See id. at 757.
262 Id. (quoting Appellate Report, supra note 250, at para. 2536)).
263 EU/US: US Pushes Ahead with Beef Hormone Sanctions, EUR. REP., July 21, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 8306681.
264 GATT Secretariat, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/ dispu e/distabe.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Japan].
265 SPS Agreement, supra note 253, at art. 2.2.266 See id. at art. 5.5.
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requirement under Article 3.3 that standards more stringent than
international standards be scientifically sufficient.267 The Appellate Body
concluded that risk assessment must reasonably support the SPS measure
at issue.268 The Appellate Body found "there is a 'scientific justification'
for an SPS measure, within the meaning of Article 3.3 [which is triggered
when a measure is more stringent than the international standard], if there
is a rational relationship between the SPS measure at issue and the
available scientific information."
269
The Appellate Body in the Japan Agricultural Products case also
elucidated Article 5.7270 of the SPS Agreement, which allows members to
impose provisional measures:
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement sets out four requirements
which must be met in order to adopt and maintain a
provisional SPS measure. Pursuant to the first sentence of
Article 5.7, a Member may provisionally adopt an SPS
measure if this measure is:
(1) imposed in respect of a situation where "relevant
scientific information is insufficient"; and
(2) adopted "on the basis of available pertinent
information."
Pursuant to the second sentence of Article 5.7, such
a provisional measure may not be maintained unless the
Member which adopted the measure:
(3) "seek[s] to obtain the additional information
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk";
and
(4) "review[s] the . . . measure accordingly within a
reasonable period of time."
271
Thus the most recent SPS case adjudicated under the WTO
Appellate Body has recognized a rational basis review standard for
267 See id. at art. 3.3. The Appellate Body states "Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should constantly
be read together. Article 2.2 informs Article 5.1: the elements that define the basic
obligation set out in Article 2.2 impart meaning to Article 5.1." Japan, supra note 264, at
para. 75 (quoting Appellate Report, supra note 250, at para. 180).2 6 8 See Japan, supra note 264, at para 76.
269 Id. at para. 79.
270 SPS Agreement, supra note 253, at art. 5.7.




determining the scientific sufficiency of risk assessments that form the
basis of health standards related to food products. Even when there is
insufficient evidence, a member can invoke a temporary SPS measure
under certain circumstances.
XI. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS POSED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FQPA
The Beef Hormone decision appears to allow a WTO panel to
review the scientific validity of the risk assessment methodology utilized
by domestic regulators. 272 The FQPA represents an increased demand on
science to provide the justification for the very stringent standards detailed
in the Act.27  The FQPA is sure to cause trade friction as countries with
less stringent pesticide standards unsuccessfully try to import food
products into the United States and are turned away when the products
reveal pesticide residue levels exceeding the new tolerances set by the
FQPA reassessment process. In the case of Canada and Mexico, the
United States is working to harmonize standards to the requirements of
U.S. legislation. However the United States could find itself in a position
similar to that of the EU in the beef hormone case, if a WTO member
challenges the scientific credibility of the stringent requirements set out
under the FQPA and the DSB determines that the extremely conservative
risk assessment methodology utilized by the EPA fails to satisfy the
scientific requirements under the GATT's SPS agreement.
The rational basis review standard established in the EC-Hormone
and Japan-Agriculture cases makes a finding against the United States
very unlikely for the moment.274  The Appellate Body in the Japan-
Agriculture case required risk management methodologies to be connected
to a risk assessment. 275 The Appellate Body did not require that the risk
assessment utilize the "best" procedure, members invoking an SPS
measure need only show that a risk assessment follow a scientific method
and be based on more than a hunch that harm might occur.276 Even the
extremely conservative methodology utilized when reassessing the
272 See Appellate Report, supra note 250, at para. 253(b), (e) (Jan. 16, 1998) (holding that
the Panel had used the proper standard of review to make an objective assessment of the
facts).
273 See Bauer, supra note 5, at 1372; Madigan, supra note 6, at 191-92.
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organophosphate/carbamate pesticide group clearly follows a scientific
method.
2 77
However, the FQPA has a number of provisions that are taking the
EPA into new areas of inquiry where there is paucity of the data needed to
conduct empirical tests.278 The EPA must still assess and reassess a large
number of tolerances while continuing to develop its policies on the
special needs of children and infants, the endocrine screening
requirements of the FQPA, and other areas mandated by the new law.
The EU has already suggested that there is no need for the United
States to establish separate acceptable daily intake levels for infants and
children.279 The EU has also stated that the ten-fold uncertainty factor that
the EPA uses is unjustified since the risk assessment methodology used is
already extremely conservative. 280  The United States may be moving
closer to the area described in the EU-Hormone case as "the beginning of
an assessment of . . . risks"281 but insufficient to sustain a showing of
scientific sufficiency.
With the passage of the FQPA of 1996, the U.S. government
signaled that it is placing more and more confidence in the ability of
science to detect and deal with toxins in the environment. However, the
EPA should consider revamping its risk assessment methodology and use
of safety factors so that they are more realistic and less likely to violate
one of the many international regimes to which the United States is now a
party.
XII. CONCLUSION
A recent editorial in Science magazine observed that the "need for
a more credible, scientific basis for environmental regulation continues.
Current models of exposure to environmental pollutants and their
associated health effects are based on conservative and often outdated
assumptions. '282 U.S. regulators should use this advice because a failure
277 See Section V of this Note.
278 See Cross, supra note 57, at 1179-1204.
279Pesticides: US. Position on Children's Safety Factor Opposed by International
Groups, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA), Feb. 4, 1998, at d6.
280 See id. The debate continues in the United States over the same issues. See
Pesticides: Industry, Environmental Groups Split over Use of FQPA Children's Safety
Factor, CHEM. REG. DAILY NEWS (BNA), Nov. 3, 1999, at d3.
28' Appellate Report, supra note 250, at para. 207.
282 William J. Madia, A Call for More Science in EPA Regulations, SCIENCE, Oct. 2,
1998, at 45.
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to bring scientific policies in line to support legislation such as the FQPA
could eventually result in a legal wrangle that may undermine the
perceived credibility of the legislation and at the same time subject the
United States to sanctions under the international legal regimes which are
becoming increasingly important as the world continues to integrate its
legal, economic, and political institutions.
